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STUDENTS' RIGHTS VERSUS ADMINISTRATORS'
IMMUNITY: GOSS v. LOPEZ AND
WOOD v. STRICKLAND

INTRODUCTION

A dramatic change in the legal relationship between school
authorities and students has taken place within the past 15 years.'
During this period there has been clear judicial recognition that
students are entitled, within bounds, to the protections of the
Federal Constitution. 2 Consequently, public school impingement
upon a student's fundamental constitutional rights is appropriate
only in response to material and substantial interference with
school discipline. 3 In accordance with this development, the modern public school administrator, once viewed as a substitute for the
student's parent, 4 is now regarded as an agent of the state.5 As
such, the school administrator must count among his professional
obligations the duty to protect the constitutional rights of his stuI The expansion of student rights may be seen as a direct outgrowth of litigation
involving student participation in the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War
protests. In the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), several black students were expelled from a public
college for participating in a civil rights sit-in. Since the expulsions had been imposed
without prior notice or a hearing, the court enjoined the dismissals on the ground that the
students' rights to due process had been violated. 294 F.2d at 158-59. In another leading
case, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), the
refusal to allow students to wear black armbands as a protest against the Vietnam War was
held to be a violation of the students' right of free speech. See generally M. NOLTE, DtrrxEs
AND LiABIIrTIES OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NOLTE].
'See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.
Id. at 511.
'Id. at 509, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
" The legal relationship of a school administrator to a student has traditionally been
defined by the doctrine of in loco parentis, according to which the administrator stands in
the place of the student's parent. The administrator assumes some of the rights and
authority normally held by the parent, but only in "matters relating to education and
conduct within the school." L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VOLZ, THE LAW AND PUBLIC
SCHOOL OPERATION 404 (1969). The legality of an administrator's action under the doctrine
of in loco parentis would depend upon "whether the administrator, acting in his capacity as a
foster parent, has acted as the average, normally prudent parent would have acted under the
circumstances." NOLTE, supra note 1, at 124. See also id. at 137.
5See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969),
wherein the Court characterized disciplinary procedures of the school as action taken by "the
State in the person of school officials."
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dents, and the legality of his behavior will6be measured in terms of
his respect for or denial of those rights.
It was early established that students are entitled to such fundamental rights as free speech. 7 The courts, however, have only
recently begun to consider the precise nature of a student's right to
education 8 and, more specifically, the procedures which an official
must follow prior to removing a student from public school. 9 Although courts have uniformly held that expulsion constitutes so
severe a deprivation as to warrant compliance with the dictates of
due process,' 0 far less unanimity of opinion has existed as to the
6 NOLTE, supra note 1,at 125. See also Comment, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context. 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971).
7 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.
Id. at 506. Courts have also recognized the right of students to form associations and groups.
See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (college could not withhold official recognition
from a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society absent showing that the association
would pose a substantial disruption). See also A. MoRsS, THE CoNsTrrioN AND AmERICAN
EDUCATION (1974); Denno, Maiy Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L.
REv. 35 (1969); Keller & Meskill, Student Rights and Due Process, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 389, 392
(1974); Smith, The Constitutional Parameters of Student Protest, 1 J.L. & EDuc. 39 (1972).
There is considerable division among the circuits as to whether public schools have the
right to regulate a student's appearance by enforcing hair and dress codes. Compare Arnold
v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (student has right to freedom of appearance
under the first and ninth amendments) with King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (dress and hair length codes not
violative of students' right to due process). See generally A. LEVINE, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS
(1973); H. PUNKE, SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF LAWSUITS OVER STUDENT HAIRSTYLES (1973);
Fortenberry, HirsuteJurisprudence:An Essay in ConstitutionalMethodology, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
1 (1975).
" See notes 36-63 and accompanying text infra.
9
See notes 10-12 infra.
10
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961). The Dixon court held that due process procedures are required prior to any
exclusion from a tax-supported college if the exclusion is of sufficient length to constitute an
expulsion. In Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969), the
court applied the Dixon requirement of due process to public elementary and secondary
schools. Since the Dixon decision, no lower federal court has sanctioned expulsions absent
adherence to the due process clause. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975); see, e.g.,
Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973); Hagopian v.
Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d
1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F.
Supp. 978, 984 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). For an exhaustive
compilation of federal precedent, see cases listed in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576-78 n.8
(1975). See also General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance, 45 F.RD.
133, 147 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc), wherein the court set up standards for "final expulsion,
indefinite or long term suspension, dismissal with deferred leave to reapply." The enunciated standards require specific charges, an opportunity for a hearing of the student's
position, and that no action be taken except on the basis of "substantial evidence." The court
noted that there was no necessity for either representation by legal counsel or other features
of a criminal investigation. Id. at 147-48.
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of suspensions," particuneed for due process in the imposition
2
larly those of short duration.'

In Goss v. Lopez 13 the Supreme Court ruled that preceding
suspensions of 1-to-10 days' duration, 14 students in public elementary and secondary schools have a right to minimal due process
protection.' 5 Shortly thereafter, in Wood v. Strickland,'6 the Court
held that school administrators and board of education members
enjoy only a qualified immunity from personal liability in civil
actions for damages resulting from the wrongful deprivation of a
student's constitutional rights.' 7 These decisions offer a further
clarification of the constitutional rights protecting a public school
student as well as new standards by which to judge the actions of
administrators who may infringe upon such rights. They represent
a choice by the Supreme Court to continue the legal trend away
from viewing the schools as parental surrogates and to place greater liability upon officials whose actions violate students' rights.
11 Suspension, a less severe sanction than expulsion, may be indefinite or of a specific
duration, from a maximum of one day to as long as several months. See Flygare, Short-Term

Student Suspensions and the Requirements of Due Process, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 529 n.3 (1974) [here-

inafter cited as Flygare].
12 Compare Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971) (30-day
suspension added onto 10-day suspension merits due process procedures) and Tate v. Board
of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (3-day suspension necessitates due process) with
Hernandez v. School Dist. No. 1, 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970) (25-day suspension does
not merit due process) and Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (N.D.N.Y. 1971)
(due process not violated by a 5-day suspension because it "cannot rationally be compared
with instances of expulsion or significant suspension periods"). Other courts have
found that suspensions of any duration require compliance with the due process clause. See,
e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp.
202 (W.D.N.C. 1972). See also notes 20-21 infra.
13 419 U.S. 565 (1975), aff'g Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
14 The Goss Court specifically noted that its ruling applies "solely to the short suspension,
not exceeding 10 days." 419 U.S. at 584. As noted by Justice Powell in his dissent, while
"[t]he court speaks of 'exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial
period,'.., its opinion makes clear that even one day's suspension invokes the constitutional
procedure mandated today." Id. at 585 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
15 According to the Court, if a student is to be subjected to a short term suspension of 10
days or less, due process demands that he
be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an
explanation -of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. The [due process] clause requires at least these rudimentary
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.
Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
16420 U.S. 308 (1975).
17 More specifically, the Strickland Court ruled that within the context of the enforcement of school discipline
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages ... if he knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to the student.
Id. at 321.
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This Note will examine the new due process requirements for
short term suspensions from public schools within the context of
the evolving doctrine of entitlement. 18 The Goss expansion of the
constitutional rights of students will then be discussed in relation to
the Strickland extension of the personal liability of school officials
who act in derogation of those rights. Some conclusory observations will be offered as to the impact of these decisions on day-today school operations and legal relationships.

Do

SHORT TERM STUDENT SUSPENSIONS REQUIRE THE
APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS?

A number of state education statutes authorize a principal or
an administrator to effect a short term suspension, but do not
require these school officials to observe even minimal due process
procedures prior to the imposition of such disciplinary action. 19 In
passing upon the legitimacy of these suspensions, courts have displayed marked disagreement in their determinations of: (1) what
constitutes a "short" suspension,2 0 (2) whether any due process
requirement should attach to the short suspension,2 ' and (3) as18 The doctrine of entitlement, as delineated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), represents an expansion of the property rights protected by the due process clause.
Under the entitlement doctrine, a benefit granted by a governmental entity to a class of
individuals becomes the intangible property of all those entitled to the benefit. In Roth, the
Court emphasized that:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire ... [or] unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.

Id. at 577 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 52-53 infra.
1
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233 (1973) (individual towns authorized to
establish rules for suspension, but application of due process not required); 11 Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 167.171 (Vernon 1959) (principals in urban districts specifically permitted to suspend
students summarily for up to 10 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-147 (1975) (principal may
suspend student without prior hearing, but suspension subject to superintendent's review);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972) (principals authorized to suspend student for up to
10 days without prior notice or hearing).
20 Typically, courts have not explicitly treated "short suspensions" as a distinct category,
but judicial examinations of due process claims have impliedly recognized such a classification in order to determine whether due process protection attaches. See, e.g., Tate v. Board
of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (suspension of three days or more merits due
process); Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971) (due process
attaches in suspension of more than 10 days); Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp. 1104
(N.D.N.Y. 1971) (no hearing needed for 5-day suspension); Dunn v. Tyler Indep. School
Dist., 327 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (no due
process needed for 3-day suspension).
21 In denying due process protection, courts generally have held that the challenged
suspension did not constitute sufficient deprivation to warrant due process, rather than find
that due process is unavailable in all suspension cases. See, e.g., Linwood v. Board of Educ.,
463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972), wherein the court stated that
a suspension for so relatively short a period [7 days] for reasonably proscribed
conduct is a minor disciplinary penalty which the legislature may elect to treat
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suming due process is necessary, precisely what will constitute due
process in these circumstances. 22 In Goss v. Lopez the Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, answered all three questions with
23
clarity, if not unanimity.
Goss v. Lopez
Factual Background
Goss involved a demand for injunctive relief by nine Ohio
public school students who received short suspensions for misconduct during a period of student unrest.2 4 The students' suspensions were initiated pursuant to an Ohio statute that empowered a
school principal to suspend a student for as many as 10 days
without prior notice of the reasons for the suspension or a hearing
to evaluate the validity of the charges.2 5 The principal was only
required to notify the students' parents of the reasons for the
26
suspension within 24 hours of its imposition.
The circumstances and alleged misconduct of the individual
students in Goss varied considerably. Some of the students were
disciplined for engaging in defiant or aggressive behavior in the
presence of the principal who instituted the suspensions,27 while
differently from expulsion or prolonged suspension without violating a constitutional right of the student.
Id. at 768-69. Contra, Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (notice and
hearing required prior to any suspension or expulsion); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202
(W.D.N.C. 1972) (due process attaches to all suspensions regardless of the duration).
22
Generally, courts have followed the rule enunciated in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), that "the minimum
procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process should depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties involved." 294 F.2d at 155, citing Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See, e.g., Tate v. Board of Educ., 452
F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (due process required in short suspension consists of telling the
student what he is accused of doing, revealing the evidentiary basis of the accusation, and
giving him a chance to explain his version of the incident); Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (student entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard, but names of all
witnesses against him and copies of their testimony need not be furnished); Vail v. Board of
Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H. 1973) (full evidentiary hearing required prior to a
suspension of five days or more, while only "administrative consultation" required prior to
suspension
of a shorter duration).
23
Justice White authored the majority opinion expressing the views of Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and by
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, wrote the dissent.
24419 U.S. at 569.
21 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972).
26
1d.

27 419 U.S. at 569. Six of the named plaintiffs were suspended either for acting in direct
defiance of the principal or for resisting police officers who, at the request of the principal,
were attempting to disperse a demonstration being held in the school auditorium. All six
students were given 10-day suspensions. One student received two additional 10-day suspensions for other violations, and another was transferred to a different school. Id. n.4.
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others were suspended for disruptive actions not personally witnessed by the official who ordered the disciplinary sanction imposed. 28 In addition to seeking a judicial determination that the
suspension statute unconstitutionally authorized school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their right to an education without
providing a hearing of any kind, 29 the students asked that all
references to the suspension be expunged from their records and
that school officials be enjoined from issuing further suspensions
under the challenged statute. 30 A three-judge federal district
court3 l held that the Ohio suspension statute was unconstitutional
and ordered the school administrators to formulate new disciplinary procedures consonant with the requirements of due process. 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
determination, ruling that the Ohio suspension statute deprived
the students of their fourteenth amendment rights to procedural
due process.:3 According to the Goss Court, due process requires
that short suspensions be preceded by notice of the reasons for the
disciplinary action accompanied by an informal hearing wherein
the student may present his version of the incident.3 4 Finally, the
Court affirmed the district court's order that reference to the
suspensions be removed from the students' records.3 5 It is
suggested that the significance of the decision lies in the Court's
finding that students have a property right in their public school
education which may not be abridged without due process.
25

One plaintiff was among 75 other students who were suspended following a distur-

bance in the school cafeteria. The student testified that he had been an innocent bystander,
but that he had been afforded no opportunity to question the propriety of his suspension.
Another student participated in a demonstration at a high school other than the one she
attended. Before she was able to return to her own school, she received a letter informing
her that she had been suspended. The Court found that the student's record, which did not
disclose the source of the information on which the suspension was grounded, indicated that
she had received no hearing. Id. at 570-71. The Court's concern with the unfortunate
possibility of mistaken identity, which is present when students are, as here, suspended
without a prior hearing, suggests that the particular facts of these two suspensions weighed
heavily in its analysis and decision. See i& at 579-80.
29
Id. at 569.
30

1d.
When an action is brought in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of an
allegedly unconstitutional state statute, an injunction may only be granted by a three-judge
district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
a 372 F. Supp. at 1279.
The crucial passage of the fourteenth amendment provides: "No state shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
:4 419 U.S. at 581-84.
35
Id. at 584.
3"
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A State-Created "Right" to Education
Education has been said to be one of the "most important"
obligations of society;3 6 nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 7 held that no constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental right to an education exists. 38 Although
that ruling apparently suggests that suspended students are not
entitled to due process safeguards, 39 it seems best understood in
the limited context of equal protection of law and thus not dispositive of students' rights to due process.4 °
Unlike equal protection claims, the right to due process does
not depend upon a finding of a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution. 4 1 At one time due process protections were held
to apply to only a limited number of "rights," and these rights were
distinguished from unprotected "privileges" such as public
employment. 42 This distinction, however, has been supplanted by a
more flexible mode of analysis. 4 3 Today, the right to due process
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments
....
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment.
Id. at 493; accord, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
37411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"s In Rodriguez, the Court undertook its search for a fundamental constitutional right to

education in order to establish the proper degree ofjudicial review for an equal protection
claim. Since the Court found no fundamental right, it did not employ strict judicial scrutiny;
instead, it required only that the challenged state statute be supported by a rational basis.
Noting that education is "not among the rights afforded explicit protection" under the
Constitution, the Court was also unable to find any "basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected." Id. at 35. Although it reaffirmed the significance of education, the Court recognized that "the importance of a service performed by the state does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 31.
'9 See Flygare, supra note 11, at 53. In Goss, the defendant administrators, relying upon
Rodriguez, contended that due process could not protect the students because there is no
constitutional right to a public education. 419 U.S. at 572.
40 Equal protection and due process claims involve different analytical tests. An equal
protection evaluation is initially concerned with the existence of afundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, see note 38 supra, while due process is dependent upon a finding of
a protected interest that falls within the coverage of the fourteenth amendment. A court may
find that a particular interest, though not a fundamental right, is protected by due process.
Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no fundamental constitutional right to
welfare benefits for equal'protection purposes) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(welfare
41 recipient has a protected interest in welfare benefits entitling him to due process).
See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
42
See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an equally divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951), wherein public employment was generally held to be a "privilege," not a
"right," and hence procedural due process guarantees were held to be inapplicable.
"' A number of cases have followed Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971),
which thoroughly rejected the rights-privileges distinction. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
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requires only a protected interest "encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property.""
In a recent line of cases culminating with Board of Regents v.
Roth,4 5 the Supreme Court has discussed the expansive nature of
the liberty and property rights that come within the fourteenth
amendment's shield of due process. 46 As the Court explained in
Roth, the critical threshold in any due process claim is the finding
of a protected interest.47 The proper method of determining the
presence of such a protected interest is to evaluate the nature,
rather than the weight, of the interest involved.4 8 To illustrate this
vital distinction, consider a hypothetical situation in which a state
appropriates an individual's privately owned automobile. The nature of the individual's interest is represented by his property right
in the automobile. The weight of his interest is represented by the
amount of harm suffered by the individual in terms of the
pecuniary loss or inconvenience caused by the state action. According to Roth, if an interest, by its nature, is protected, due process
immediately attaches regardless of the weight of that interest. 49 To
determine the specific degree of due process to be afforded, however, a court must then weigh the gravity of the deprivation likely
to be suffered by the individual against the state's interest in taking
its proposed action. Depending upon the balance struck, greater or
lesser procedural formalities will be deemed proper.5 0
'The first step for the Goss Court, therefore, was to determine
51
whether the students had a protected interest in their education.
man, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Rights-PrivilegesDistinctionin
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
44 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
45 Id. at 564 (nontenured teacher who was not rehired had no property interest in

continued employment sufficient to require due process protection).
46 In Roth, the Court noted that:
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among the
"[g]reat [constitutional] concepts... purposely left to gather meaning from experience.... rt]hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the
statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society
remains unchanged."
Id. at 571, quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
47The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and
property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior
hearing is paramount.
408 U.S. at 569-70 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
48id. at 570-71; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Flygare, supra note 11, at 533.
49 408 U.S. at 569-70.
0

5 Id. at 570 n.8, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970).
51 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975).

110
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In Roth the Supreme Court noted that the most common source of
constitutionally protected property interests is not the Constitution,
but rather state statutes guaranteeing a benefit to a specified class
of people.5 2 Once the individual establishes himself as a member of
such a class, he acquires a right or entitlement to that benefit which
is safeguarded by due process.5 3 Based upon this expansive definition of "property interests" in Roth, the Goss Court found that the
suspended students did have a protected property interest in education.
As the source of the students' property interest in their education, the Goss majority pointed to the Ohio statute directing local
authorities to provide free public education to all State residents
between the ages of 6 and 21. 54 Additional reliance was placed
upon a statutory provision mandating that school be attended by all
such residents for a minimum of 32 weeks per year.5 5 The Court
reasoned that the State of Ohio had thus elected to bestow the right
to an education upon all people within a particular age classification. 56 Though it was not obligated under the United States Constitution to establish a public school system, once the State chose to
do so, it created a protected property interest within the Roth
framework. The Court therefore held that Ohio could not terminate that right without providing fundamentally fair procedures to
determine whether the alleged misconduct had indeed occurred.5 7
The Court also found that the suspension of the students in
Goss amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of their liberty,
and, as such, was independently sufficient to necessitate due process protection. It was established in Roth that in addition to traditional aspects of liberty such as freedom from unlawful imprisonment, another protected interest in liberty is an individual's right to
" Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.

408 U.S.
at 577.
5

" See, e.g., Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners possess a protected
interest in statutorily accumulated credits for good time); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (government employees whose employment is guaranteed
in the absence of "cause" for dismissal possess a protected interest in their employment);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have a protected interest in their parole
status); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients, so long as they qualify for
payments under the established statutory criteria, possess a protected interest in their
benefits).
54 419 U.S. at 573, citing OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, .64 (1972).
5 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (1972).

S6 4 19 U.S. at 574.

57 Id.
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his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.""8 Under this
approach, an individual is entitled to due process protection
against any state action that would have the effect of damaging his
reputation by creating a "stigma or badge of disgrace." 5 9 Noting
that a suspension from school of any duration on grounds of
misconduct became part of the student's permanent record, the
Goss Court recognized that such "charges could seriously damage
the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as
well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and
60
employment."
The Court acknowledged that the degree of harm inflicted
upon the property and liberty interests of the students in Goss was
slight. Nevertheless, it concluded that so long as the deprivations
were not "de minimis,"' i.e., wholly unsubstantial, at least minimal
due process must be provided.62 Though not unaware of the very
broad authority of the State to maintain standards of conduct
within its schools, the Court warned that the State is nevertheless
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a
public education as a property interest which is protected by the
Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without6 3adherence to the minimum procedures required
by that Clause.
The due process analysis of the majority was sharply criticized
by Justice Powell, who argued that it had misconceived the nature
of property rights as enunciated in Roth. 64 Conceding that the Ohio
education statute had indeed created a protected interest in education, Justice Powell called the majority's attention to the language
in Roth where the Court held that property interests "are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules ... such as state
law." 65 Since the Ohio statute explicitly authorized a principal to
58408 U.S. at 573, citing Wisconsin v. Constatineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). In
Constatineau the public "posting" without notice or hearing of the names of presumed
alcoholics to whom liquor was not to be sold was held to constitute a deprivation of liberty.
See also Flygare, supra note 11, at 535.
5
9Wisconsin v. Constatineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
60419 U.S. at 575. The Goss Court relied in part upon evidence that, in admissions
applications, many colleges routinely request information about suspensions. Id. The Court
also observed that Congress had recently seen fit to limit access to information in files of
students in federally funded schools. Md. n.7.
61The Goss Court borrowed the phrase "de minimis" from Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Sniadich v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). For a discussion of
Justice Powell's criticism of this application of the de minimus test, see note 79 infra.
62 419 U.S. at 574.
6
a Id.
64
1Id. at 586 (Powell, J., dissenting).
6
5Id. (emphasis in original), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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suspend a student for up to 10 days, the conclusion to be reached
from a consideration of the entire statutory scheme governing
education in Ohio, was, in Justice Powell's view, that the property
interest granted by statute provided for free education subject to
suspensions of up to 10 days. 6 Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff students suffered no deprivation of their rights since the
67
benefit was initially qualified.
Entitlement and Due Process -

Three Views

Since it strikes at the very heart of procedural due process and
the doctrine of entitlement, the dispute between the majority and
minority anal)ses is an important one. If a state chooses to bestow a
benefit or interest upon a specific group of individuals, may it also
unreservedly limit the right to that benefit without regard to due
process requirements? The majority's answer to this question
would seem to be in the negative. The Powell view, on the other
hand, appears, at first glance, to support a state's unlimited authority to define, restrict, or withdraw the constitutionally protected
interests that have been statutorily conferred. Powelrs concurring
opinion in a recent entitlement case, Arnett v. Kennedy,6 8 suggests,
however, that the Justice does not favor so severe an approach.
In Arnett, a civil servant 69 unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of his dismissal from employment"0 on the ground
that the statutory termination mechanisms 7 ' did not meet the
minimum requisites of due process.7 2 Justice Powell relied upon
the statutory entitlement- analysis of Roth to argue that once the
6 419 U.S. at 586-87 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell suggested that the majority's error was its "posturing the case as if Ohio
had conferred an unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the school authorities
to conform to due process procedures in imposing the most routine discipline." Id. at 587
(footnote omitted). In addition, he did not believe that brief suspensions so seriously injured
a student's reputation as to deprive him of his "liberty" and thus require due process. Id. at
589, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (failure to rehire nontenured
teacher did not cause sufficient damage to reputation to constitute a deprivation of liberty).
:s416 U.S. 134 (1974).
69 Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee in the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) who was dismissed on charges of dishonesty for allegedly spreading false rumors
about other OEO employees. Id. at 136-37.
70Kennedy's claim of entitlement to his employment was founded upon a statutory
section which provided: "An individual in the competitive service may be removed or
suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5
U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
71 The employment statute provided that upon dismissal the individual was entitled to
written apprisal of the reasons for his dismissal, notice of the action and charges, an
opportunity to file a written answer, and a written decision. Id. § 7501(b).
72The termination procedures failed to provide a hearing until after the employee had
been dismissed. Id.
67
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statute has conferred a constitutionally protected property interest,
due process safeguards may not be summarily avoided. 3 Although
the protected interest may have been a creation of the legislature,
the right to due process, the Justice emphasized, is conferred "not
by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. 7 4
Justice Powell's dissent in Goss,7 5 which stressed the power of a
state to define the dimensions of a statutorily conferred benefit,
appears to contradict his earlier denial in Arnett of legislative authority to limit the due process protection of rights it had conferred. The apparent inconsistency may be resolved, however, by
examining a footnote to the Goss dissent.7 6 There, Powell emphasized that the statutory grant in Arnett explicitly guaranteed that
there could be no dismissal from employment without a showing of
"cause," whereas the Ohio education statute in Goss contained no
equivalent qualification.7 7 The Justice viewed this difference as an
indication that the Ohio Legislature had not believed that a short
suspension would subject a student to a grievous loss. Conversely,
termination of employment, as in Arnett, and expulsion from school
were treated by Justice Powell as grievous penalties sufficient 7to8
justify the judiciary's authority to set due process standards.
Taken together, Powell's opinions in Goss and Arnett suggest that he
would demand strict adherence to the due process doctrine of
entitlement only to guard against grievous deprivations of pro79
tected interests.
In contrast to the approaches of Justice Powell and the Goss
majority, Justice Rehnquist, in his plurality opinion in Arnett, did
argue in favor of a state's power to designate the procedures by
which a statutorily conferred benefit might be terminated. He took
73 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
41d- at 167.
75419 U.S. at 586-87 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 587 n.4.
77id.
"See id-

7"Justice Powell argued that the majority's conclusion -that thenature of the interest is
the threshold test for determining whether due process should attach - was founded upon
cases which in fact involved a serious or grievous loss. Id. at 587-88. Among the cases cited by
the Justice were Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (parole revocation inflicts
grievous loss); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (license revocation affects important
interests); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (access to courts to obtain a
divorce deemed a significant interest); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits imposes grievous loss).
The Justice further contended that the de minimis test applied by the Goss majority, see
notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra, is irrelevant to entitlement cases since Sniadich v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), from which the phrase was drawn, involved a
property dispute between private parties, rather than property interests conferred by the
state. 419 U.S. at 588 n.5.
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the position that Roth's acknowledgement of legislative power to
"define" the dimensions of the right given meant that, in granting a
property interest, the legislature could simultaneously design the
procedural rules defining the limitations of that interest.8 0 Viewing
a substantive benefit as being "inextricably intertwined" with the
limitations on procedural due process correspondingly placed
upon the benefit, Rehnquist concluded that "a litigant . . . must
take the bitter with the sweet." 8 1
Thus, at least three distinctly different opinions have recently
been expressed within the Court as to the proper evaluation and
treatment of a legislature's attempt to limit the constitutionally
protected interests it confers by statute. The Goss majority contended that when a state grants a benefit which amounts to a
constitutionally protected interest, due process will automatically
attach. If the state seeks to revoke or diminish the benefit to any
significant extent, 8 2 the procedures employed must comport with
the requirements of due process.
A conflicting view is represented by the Rehnquist opinion in
Arnett. This view suggests that since the state created the right in
the first instance, it should have the power to limit the due process
required to withdraw that benefit.8 3 Such an analysis would seem to
apply without any reference to the degree of harm caused by
impinging upon that interest since, the Justice reasoned, absent the
statute the individual had nothing in the first place. 84 The Rehnquist view might be paraphrased to read "as the statute giveth,
so the statute taketh away." Any evaluation of this position should
80 416 U.S. at 153. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion by Justice Stewart and
Chief Justice Burger. The majority of the Justices concluded that Kennedy had received
adequate due process procedures, but disagreed with Rehnquist's interpretation of the
doctrine of entitlement. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that the Constitution, and not the statute, determines which due process requirements attach to a
statutory benefit, see text accompanying notes 73-74 supra, but concurred in the decision,
reasoning that the procedures provided by the statute satisfied such constitutional requirements. Id. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White also argued that the Constitution,
and not the statute, defines the requisites of due process. He believed, however, that the
statutory procedures were constitutionally defective for their failure to guarantee an impartial hearing officer. Id. at 203 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas, dissented on the ground that a full
evidentiary hearing was constitutionally required before the employee could be discharged.
Id.at 226-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, six Justices (Powell, Blackmum, White, Marshall,
Brennan, and Douglas) agreed that once a state confers a property interest, the Constitution,
not the statute, defines the due process necessary to deprive the individual of that right. See
id. at 185 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81
1d. at 154.
12 The Goss Court stated that due process would protect any deprivation of a protected
interest that was not de minimis. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra.
84 416 U.S. at 153.
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recognize that the doctrine of entitlement was, in part, developed
to replace the old wooden distinction between. rights and
privileges. 85 The view of entitlement espoused by Justice Rehnquist
would give the states a free reign to limit by statute the procedural
safeguards accompanying benefits that formerly were called
"privileges," while full due process protection would still be afforded individuals whose constitutionally guaranteed "rights" were
threatened. Hence, the Rehnquist view would seem inevitably to
lead back to a resuscitation of the rights-privileges distinction. 6
The somewhat more elusive view of Justice Powell seems to
rest upon the use of a weighing process as the first step in finding a
protected interest. The weighing test would not permit a legislature
to abandon or limit due process safeguards where the withdrawal
of a benefit would inflict grievous harm upon the individual. If the
removal of the benefit would not cause severe injury, however,
Justice Powell would be more permissive in allowing the legislature
to fashion the due process attendant upon the interest. As opposed
to the Goss majority, which, it should be recalled, concentrated
upon the nature of the interest, reqiiriia only that the loss not be
de minimis, 7 Justice Powell, in his dissent, called for an initial
determination of whether the weight of the threatened deprivation
assumes constitutional dimensions.88 The Powell position's greatest
strength lies in the fact that it would prevent federal judicial intervention into state decisions unless individuals are being seriously
harmed. The most notable weakness in the Powell approach lies in

"' See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
86Indeed, Justice Marshall has already cautioned that acceptance of the Rehnquist view
would revive the rights-privileges approach to due process:
A majority of the Court rejects Mr. Jusuce Rehnquist's argument that because
appellee's entitlement arose from statute, it could be conditioned on a statutory
limitation of procedural due process protections, an approach which would render
such protection inapplicable to the deprivation of any statutory benefit -any
privilege" extended by Government -where a statute prescribed a termination
procedure, no matter how arbitrary or unfair. It would amount to nothing less than
a return, albeit in somewhat different verbal garb, to the thoroughly discredited
distinction between rights and privileges which once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 211 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a different interpretation of the Rehnquist view see The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88
HARv. L. REv. 83, 86-88 (1974). The theory presented is that the very concept of entitlement
is "illusory" because legislatures may draft statutes in such a way as to incorporate procedural limits into the substantive guarantee itself. The legislature could "thus adopt substantive
restrictions which have the effect of limiting procedural rights." Id. at 87.
87
See notes 47-53 & 61-62 supra.
88 Contrary to the Court's assertion, our cases support, rather than "refute" appellants' argument that the due process clause comes into play only when the state
subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss."
419 U.S. at 587-88 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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its inherent lack of predictability. A state legislature would pass
statutes without any more guidance than its best guess as to what
sort of deprivation a court might subsequently consider grievous.
The Goss majority recognized that precedent8 9 supports the
use of the two-part analytical scheme pursuant to which a finding
based on the nature of an interest will trigger the right to due
process, subject only to the easily met de minimis threshold test.
Once the protected interest is established, the court will examine
the weight of the benefit and the grievousness of the hardship in
order to determine the proper degree of due process required
within the specific context. A major value of the majority's approach is that it takes full advantage of the enormous flexibility of
due process itself.90 At one end of the due process spectrum lie the
strict evidentiary rules and technical procedures designed to protect vigilantly the liberty of the defendant in a criminal trial. At the
opposite end are the bare requirements of prior notification and an
informal hearing to prevent an unfair, but less damaging, deprivation of a protected interest.
The Powell approach, in its dependence upon grievous harm,
would necessarily result in the implementation of only the more
demanding facets of due process. Failing to apply due process to
less severe infringements of protected interests, this view would
render minimal levels of due process dormant in the area of statutory entitlements. In contrast, the Goss approach would better utilize
the broad range of due process procedures. If the deprivation to
be suffered by the individual is less than grievous, the minimal due
process procedures would apply. If the deprivation reaches grievous proportions, more formal aspects of due process would be in
order.
By requiring a minimum degree of due process for short suspensions, the Goss Court appears to have struck a proper balance
between the interests of the student and the school. A student's
main interest in the face of a suspension is to avoid exclusion from
the educational process due to unfairness or mistake. 91 The institution's paramount interest is the orderly operation of the school for

"

See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 69 (1972). In Fuentes the Court noted that length
and severity of deprivation, while significant factors, are "not decisive of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind." Id at 86.
9
OSee Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), wherein the Court
stated that "[tihe very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Id. at 895.
" See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
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the benefit of all students. This requires the ability to act swiftly
and expeditiously to remove a disruptive student before he has an
opportunity to instigate further difficulties.
The Goss decision to require that a student receive prior notice
of the reason for the proposed suspension, an explanation of the
evidence against him, as well as an opportunity to present his side
of the story,9 2 provides a substantial shield against overt injustices
such as mistaken identity. At the same time, the procedures are not
so formal, technical, or time consuming as to create an undue
burden upon the school administration. Indeed, the standard of
notice and hearing demanded by the Court is less stringent than
93
that normally practiced in a great many school systems.
Moreover, specific provisions have been made to ensure prompt
action in what the Court referred to as an "emergency situation,"
where the immediate presence of the student represents a continuing threat to persons or property or a potential disruption of the
academic process. 94 In such an emergency the requirements of
prior notice and hearing need not be met, and the student may be
immediately removed from the school.
In his dissent, Justice Powell expressed his concern with what
he considered to be an improper reliance upon the judiciary in an
ordinary dispute between schools and students. 95 It must be emphasized, however, that the judicial imposition of due process requirements gives the individual no more formal procedures than
the state should have sought to provide in the first place. 9 6 Due
2

9 Id. at 581. One of the most fundamental requirements of due process is that notice

and hearing precede the imposition of any deprivation. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), wherein the Court stated that while the words of the due
process clause have been a subject of controversy, "there can be no doubt that at a minimum
they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing ....
Id. at 313. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
93 Several of the schools involved in Goss espoused policies for suspension which provided procedural safeguards equal to, or in excess of, those required by the Court. 419 U.S.
at 583.
4
1 1d. at 582-83.
95
Id. at 589-600 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell expressed dismay at the potential
ramifications of the majority's holding:
One can only speculate as to the extent to which public education will be disrupted
by giving every schoolchild the power to contest in court any decision ... which
arguably infringes the state-conferred right to education.
Id. at 600 n.22 (emphasis in original).
"6See generally Endicott v. Van Petten, 330 F. Supp. 878 (D.C. Kan. 1971), wherein the
court, chiding defendant school administrators, questioned
the reluctance of the defendants, an arm of the state, to provide fundamental
fairness to those persons with whom they deal in an area so vital as public education, for it is only fundamental fairness that is required by the Constitution.
Id. at 885.
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process does not place unreasonable demands upon the state; nor
does it prevent the state from taking necessary action. It merely
provides assurance that the individual whose interests are in
97
jeopardy has been treated fairly.
Finally, the Goss approach to due process affords a high level
of predictability. As a result of Goss, a legislature should be fully
aware that if a statute confers benefits upon groups of people, and
if such benefits constitute protected interests, it should also provide
fair and reasonable safeguards against arbitrary or mistaken withdrawal of those benefits. If the statute fails to do so, the federal
judiciary may impose due process procedures upon the state.
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS'

SECTION

LIABILITY IN

1983 ACTIONS

Viewed from the perspective of the school administrator, the
Goss decision provides specific guidelines for the imposition of a
minimal suspension only. Whether more serious forms of separation from the school will require added due process protections
remains an unsettled issue, 98 but at least Goss supplies the administrator with a general model according to which he may monitor his
behavior. The availability of such a model is particularly important in light of the school official's potential personal liability,
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 99 for infringing upon a
student's constitutional rights.
Until recently, even the threat of this liability did not pose a
significant check upon the administrator's freedom of action, since
a number of unsettled issues limited the remedial utility of section
1983.100 A major source of confusion was the apparent contradic7

' See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), wherein it is noted that decisions made in secrecy can never be conducive to
finding the truth and that the individual in jeopardy need be given notice of the case against
him and an opportunity to be heard.
98 The Goss Court admitted that longer suspensions or expulsions "may require more
formal procedures." 419 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983, which is derived from the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, is the general vehicle by which an individual
may bring a civil suit against any person who, through the exercise of state governmental
authority, has infringed upon the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. The section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
100 Persistent problems have been caused by § 1983's restricted application to "persons"
acting under state law. See note 99 supra. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961), it
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tion between section 1983, which was created to permit a civil suit
against a state governmental official, and the common law principle
of sovereign immunity. 0 1 Under common law, public officials were
protected from civil suit in order to facilitate forthright decisionmaking.'0 2 Despite early suggestions that the creation of section
was established that a municipality was not a "person" for the purposes of the predecessor of
§ 1983. Thus, municipalities could not be held liable for unconstitutional actions taken by
their officers, even though these officers were personally liable under § 1983. The immunity
of municipalities was later held to protect state governments as well. Williford v. California,
352 F.2d 474, 496 (9th Cir. 1965). Consistent with the eleventh amendment of the Federal
Constitution, which grants the states immunity from suit in the federal courts, Monroe
achieved some success in smoothing the waters. A number of subsequent decisions, however,
have suggested that Monroe was decided on the basis of policy considerations and hence need
not be applied to all governmental entities in all situations as a shield against a § 1983 action.
See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); Wall v. Stanly
County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770
(8th Cir. 1966). See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55
MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1210 (1971). Prospective litigants seeking to employ § 1983 must note
that a suit against the state may not be disguised as an action against an individual officer.
The eleventh amendment "bars suits not only against the State when it is the named party
but also when it is the party in fact." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); accord,
Edelmart v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). See also Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971).
A further problem was the specific relief available against an individual officer under
§ 1983. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908), clearly established that a state official
who had deprived another of a federal right was stripped of the state's eleventh amendment
protection and would be "subjected in his person to consequences of his individual conduct."
Young, however, involved only the injunctive power of the courts over an official: the
availability of compensatory damages has been only recently confronted. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) ("damages against individual defendants are a permissible
remedy in some circumstances"); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (availability of compensatory damages recognized); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229
(1969) (compensatory damages could lie for any violation of constitutional rights).
Since § 1983 has been deemed a "supplementary" federal cause of action, Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), a number of procedural controversies have developed. For
example, difficult issues of res judicata between the state and federal courts have been
raised. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 75 (1973); McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections, 60 VA. L. REv.
1 (1974).
101 For a comprehensive discussion of the legal and historical development of the
concept of sovereign immunity and its adoption into the American legal system, see Jaffe,
Suits 10
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963).
2Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: DamageActions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 223
(1963). As noted by the Supreme Court, "The concept of immunity assumes [that officials
may err] and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from
such error than not to decide or act at all." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974). In
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge Learned Hand put forth his oft
quoted argument that it is a pragmatic necessity for administrative officials to have absolute
immunity:
[Ain official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others,
or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not
escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to
confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
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1983 had abrogated common law immunity, the Supreme Court
has held that officials of the legislative and judicial branches of
government still enjoy absolute immunity when acting within the
scope of their duties.' 0 3 Officials within the executive branch, however, have been held to possess only a qualified immunity. 10 4 The
particular limits upon the immunity of an executive official thus
became the focal point of section 1983 suits, and the delineation of
these limits became an important and difficult problem for the
courts.
Wood v. Strickland
Qualified Immunity for School Officials
In Wood v. Strickland'0 5 the Supreme Court turned its attention
to the specific scope of immunity available to a school administrator
whose actions violate a student's constitutional rights.' 0 6 By its
holding in Strickland that the administrator's immunity from suit
may be overcome by a showing of either malice or unreasonable
disregard of settled constitutional rights, 0 7 the Supreme Court has
put sharp teeth into the section 1983 remedy.
Like Goss, Strickland involved the propriety of school disciplinary procedures' 0 8 - the Strickland plaintiffs, however, had been
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the
public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in
the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of
his good faith.
Id. at 581.
103 In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court determined that the
Congress, in enacting § 1983, had not intended to destroy the traditional immunity afforded
the legislative branch and that such immunity was absolute. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967), the Court held that absolute immunity also existed to protect the judicial branch
of government and was reasonably and traditionally beyond the reach of the legislature.
104E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (policemen enjoy a qualified
immunity dependent upon good faith and probable cause for their actions). See also Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. Rav. 263 (1937); Keefe, PersonalTort
Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 (1943).
105 420 U.S. 308 (1975), vacating and remanding Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186 (8th
Cir. 1973), remanding 348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
106 For a discussion of students' constitutional rights, see note 7 supra.
107 420 U.S. at 322.
108 The facts of the Strickland case suggest that the entire incident arose from an
innocuous, though ill-advised, prank. The two plaintiffs decided to enliven a parent-student
school function by "spiking" punch with alcohol. The girls mixed two small bottles of malt
liquor into a large quantity of soft drink, making a mildly alcoholic beverage. Though the
punch was served at the meeting with no visible effect, news of the prank spread throughout the school and eventually reached both the teacher who had been in charge of the
extracurricular activity and the school principal. The principal suspended the students for a
maximum of two weeks and reported the occurrence at a school board meeting that evening.
The girls were informed of the meeting, but neither they nor their parents were permitted
to attend. The board voted to expel the offending students for the remainder of the
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subjected to the more serious penalty of expulsion. 10 9 Alleging that
such expulsion had been imposed in the absence of procedural due
process, the students sought compensatory and punitive damages
from members of the school board, two school administrators," 0
and the Special School District of Mena, Arkansas."' In addition,
reinstatement, injunctive protection from any further sanctions,
and expunction of the incident from the school records were re-

quested." 2
The district court held that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was dependent upon a determination that the board members
had acted with "malice," which it defined as "ill will against a

person - a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or
excuse.""13 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit remanded." 4 Criticizing the district court's "erroneous view of the
law," the court of appeals held that in order to hold the defendants
liable, "[lt need only be established that the defendants did not, in
the light of all the circumstances, act in good faith.""15 Although all

the cases cited by both the district court and the court of appeals
applied the phrase "good faith,""16 the district court employed a
subjective test of good faith, speaking in terms of the similar, but
semester, approximately three months. The pupils, accompanied by their parents and
counsel, were permitted to appeal the board's decision two weeks after the expulsion was
instituted. While they admitted their violation of the school rule forbidding alcoholic beverages on campus, the students maintained that their conduct did not warrant so severe a
penalty. The board, voting not to alter its policy, upheld the expulsions. Id. at 311-13.
"' The Strickland plaintiffs were expelled for the remainder of the semester. The
students had to take a correspondence course as well as an additional course after graduation in order to graduate with their class. Id. at 313 n.5.
'1 0 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's directed verdicts in favor of the two
school administrators, reasoning that there was no evidence that they had participated in the
decision to expel the plaintiffs. 485 F.2d at 191. Since the plaintiffs did not appeal these
verdicts, the administrators' liability was not considered by the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at
309 n.l.
"' The district court, looking to the protection afforded by the eleventh amendment,
found the school district immune from liability. 348 F. Supp. at 244. The court reached this
determination by relying on the interpretation given § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), which held that a municipality (and impliedly other governmental entities) is not a
"person" subject to a § 1983 action. Since the plaintiffs did not appeal this aspect of the
decision, the school district was not a party before the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 309 n.1.
112 420 U.S. at 309.
"' 348 F. Supp. at 248.
114 485 F.2d at 186.
"'SId. at 191.
"'See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1968) (school board
members said to be immune if their decision was made in good faith and was based upon
'Justifiable grounds'); McDonough v. Kelly, 329 F. Supp. 144, 151 (D.N.H. 1971) ("even
though the dismissal was... violative of due process, it was done in good faith."); Gouge v.
Joint School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (in § 1983 action against school board
for wrongful dismissal of teacher, defendants protected by qualified immunity based upon
good faith).
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not identical, concept of malice,' 17 while the court of appeals held
that "[t]he test is an objective, rather than a subjective, one."'118
Assuming good faith is the correct standard, the key issue becomes
whether it ought to be evaluated subjectively," 9 objectively, 2 ° or as
containing both subjective and objective elements. 1
The Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the competing factors. In developing for administrators a qualified immunity from
section 1983 claims, both the protection of an official from liability
for good faith mistakes and the preservation of a vital remedy to
protect a citizen from deprivation of his constitutional rights were
considered. 2 2 The goal of a properly formulated qualified immunity is, according to the Court, to permit the administrator to make
117 348 F. Supp. at 248. Although the court instructed the jury that the good faith of the
defendants was a complete defense, the charge ultimately made was that the judgment of
school directors is not open to question unless malice is shown and that there could be no
liability for damages unless the "defendant's action, was the result of 'malice' toward the
plaintiffs .... ." Id. at 250. The court further stated that "so long as the exercise of
independent judgment is free of 'malice' and/or is an action in good faith, there can be no
action for damages." Id.
1181485 F.2d at 191.
119 The subjective good faith test was succinctly delineated in Cobb v. Malden, 202 F.2d
701 (lst Cir. 1953), wherein Chief Judge Magruder stated that officials in the executive
branch of government do not have absolute immunity, but rather possess
a qualified privilege, giving them a defense against civil liability, for harms caused
by acts done by them in good faith in performance of their official duty as they
understood it.
Id. at 707 (Magruder, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
A number of courts have employed similar subjective evaluations of official behavior.
See, e.g., Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970);
Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843
(1969); Wood v. Goodman, 381 F. Supp. 413 (D. Mass. 1974); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310
F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Bradford v. School Dist., 244 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.S.C. 1965), aff'd, 364 F.2d
185 (4th Cir. 1966).
120 In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), the Supreme Court implemented an
objective standard of review for determining the availability of the qualified immunity
defense in a § 1983 action against police officers. The Court held that the defense of "good
faith and probable cause" would protect police officers from suits for false arrest. Subsequent cases have similarly evaluated the good faith immunity of school officials by specifically examining the circumstances surrounding a dispute. See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485
F.2d 334, 344 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (good and valid
reason for the decision required); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1968)
(justifiable grounds for the action required).
121 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). See text accompanying notes 124-25
infra. See also Comment, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q.
666.
122 420 U.S. at 319-20. See generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1964); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 221-22 (1963); Nahmad, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Immunity, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 30 (1972); Comment, Civil Liability of Subordinate State Officials Under the Civil Rights Act and the Doctrineof Official Immunity, 44 CAL. L. REv.
887 (1956); Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REv.
1229, 1232 (1955).
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mistakes in order to encourage effective official action, while simultaneously preventing abuse of that protection. 2 3
The Court achieved what it believed to be the proper balance
between the interests of a school administrator and a student who
claims a violation of his rights by holding that:
A school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or
if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation
of constitutional rights or other injury to the stu12 4
dent.
Objective and Subjective Good Faith Required
The Court enumerated several factors, any one of which, it
held, will constitute a lack of good faith sufficient to hold a school
administrator liable for damages under section 1983. The subjective components of the good faith test, which call for an examination of an official's motives, impose liability for actions taken either
in knowing disregard of the student's rights or with malicious intent
to cause harm. Under the objective component of the test, a school
administrator will lose his immunity if it is found that he "reasonably should have known" that he was violating a student's constitutional rights, regardless of his lack of actual knowledge. In this
regard, the Court reasoned that
an act violating a student's constitutional rights can be no more
justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on
the part of one entrusted with supervision
of students' daily lives
5
than by the presence of actual malice.12
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist, 1 2 6 agreed with the majority's overall
disposition of the case,'2 but in partial dissent strongly criticized
123420 U.S. at 319-20.
24
1 Id. at 322 (emphasis
12
5Id.
126

added).

at 321 (emphasis added).
Id. at 327 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same four
Justices dissented in both Strickland and Goss, signaling a strong division within the Court on
legal issues dealing with the public schools. The slim margin held by the majority in both
cases suggests that school law will remain on precarious ground for some time to come.
'17 The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' finding that there was no evidence
of the plaintiff students' violation of the school rule for which they had been expelled. The
court of appeals had based its decision on the fact that the school regulation prohibited
"intoxicating beverages," reasoning that the "spiked" punch made by the students contained
too little alcohol to be legally considered an intoxicating beverage. 485 F.2d at 189-91. The
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the majority's imposition upon public school officials of a "higher
standard of care . . . than that heretofore required of any other
official."' 28 More specifically, the dissent charged that by requiring
knowledge of "settled and indisputable law," the majority opinion
equated ignorance with actual malice, thereby imposing liability for
good faith mistakes. 2 9
In support of its position, the dissent pointed to the Court's
recent decision in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 130 In Scheuer, a section 1983
action was brought against the Governor of Ohio and officials and
members of the Ohio National Guard for the 1970 killing and
wounding of student protesters at Kent State University. In defining the standard for determining the applicability of qualified immunity, the Scheuer Court stated:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good
faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.'
Justice Powell argued that Scheuer placed less limitation on an
32
official's qualified immunity than did Strickland.'
Upon closer examination, however, it may be seen that the
standards of care required by both the Strickland and Scheuer tests
are essentially the same. Each contains objective as well as subjective components. In effect, "good faith belief," the subjective aspect
of the Scheuer test, is very similar to "malicious intention" and
knowing disregard of rights, the subjective components of the
Strickland formula. In either case, an official's immunity may be
destroyed by a showing of subjective bad faith alone.
The other aspect of the Scheuer test, "reasonable grounds for
the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,"' 3 3 is clearly objective in nature, since it permits the
trier of fact to make an independent evaluation of the prevailing
conditions and the reasonableness of the official's response to the
Supreme Court noted that there was evidence that the students did bring alcoholic beverages
onto school grounds and that it was improper to relitigate in federal court "evidentiary
questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school
regulations." 420 U.S. at 326.
128 420 U.S. at 327.
129Id. at 321.
130 416 U.S. 232 (1974), rev'g Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
'3 1 Id. at 247-48, quoted in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 330 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132 420 U.S. at 330-31.
133 416 U.S. at 247-48.

STUDENTS' RIGHTS

1975]

situation. This objective assessment necessarily requires that the
defendant official be held responsible for knowledge of factors
which he "reasonably should have known" - the very same evaluation of the defendant's conduct required by Strickland. Thus, under
either test, a defendant's'claim of ignorance will no longer afford
him complete protection.
Admittedly, by requiring that a school official have knowledge
of a student's basic unquestioned constitutional rights, Strickland
imposes a specific standard of care, whereas Scheuer does not particularize the elements of knowledge to be inferred. It is suggested
that this lack of particularization, however, stems from the procedural posture of Scheuer before the Supreme Court. In Scheuer,
plaintiffs appealed a dismissal of their cause of action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The dismissal was based upon the defendants' immunity from suit under common law and the eleventh
amendment.1 34 Without the benefit of a full factual determination,
Scheuer necessarily dealt with the issue of immunity in the abstract.
Strickland, on the other hand, reached the Court following a full
trial, and the decision drew upon all of the facts that had been
35
presented.1
It is also noteworthy that in Scheuer the Court was not attempting to define specific standards of immunity for a single administrator or for a narrow class of officials. The defendants in Scheuer
ranged in authority from one who was the Governor of Ohio to
others who were merely enlisted personnel in the National
Guard.1 36 It is axiomatic of immunity principles that the scope of
the protection expands in relation to the "scope of discretion and
responsibilities of the office"1 37 as well as the particular circumstances at the time of the action. Hence, it would be practically
impossible to articulate a specific standard of care universally
applicable to officials of any rank within the executive branch of
government. 1 38 Scheuer, therefore, required the enunciation of a
134

471 F.2d at 43.

U.S. at 314.
6
13
The defendants included "the Governor [of Ohio], the Adjutant General, and his
assistant, various named and unnamed officers and enlisted members of the Ohio National
Guard,
and the president of Kent State University." 416 U.S. at 233.
37
1
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). In Barrv. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959),
the Court noted that the immunity of the head of an executive department is wider in scope
than is the immunity protecting an officer with less sweeping duties because "the higher the
post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of
discretion, it entails." Id. at 573. Accord, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert.
denied,8 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
3 See generally 24 CAmn. U.L. RFv. 164, 173 (1974).
135 420
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general standard for determining the applicability of qualified immunity. Strickland, on the other hand, involved a limited class of
defendants, viz, school board members, whose duties in relation to
1 39
school discipline could be more easily ascertained and defined.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Strickland standard of good
faith qualified immunity is no more "harsh" than that of Scheuer,
but is merely a particularization of the general guidelines previously established by the Court, such particularization arising out of
the procedural posture of the case and the class of named defendants involved.
The Impact of Strickland On School Officials
The Strickland decision now requires school officials to be
aware of the settled and indisputable constitutional rights of students. An official who deliberately disregards or claims ignorance
of such rights will forfeit the qualified immunity which protects
him from liability under section 1983. Justice Powell and the other
dissenting Justices argued that it is too demanding to impose such a
standard upon individuals who have voluntarily accepted responsibility for the direction of public education. 4 ° Mindful of the
"hazard of even informed prophesy as to what are 'unquestioned
constitutional rights,' -141 the dissent observed that lay school officials certainly possess no "unique competency in divining the
law."'1 4 2 The Court's five-to-four decision in Goss v. Lopez was cited
as an example of the type of ruling that would not have been
predicted by many constitutional scholars, let alone school board
43
members. 1
The dissent's concern with a school official's potential liability
for decisions made in ignorance appears somewhat exaggerated.
Since ignorance of only "settled, indisputable law"'1 44 will cause a
school official to lose the protection of qualified immunity, the
Strickland decision requires a school administrator to be neither
"a9
The Strickland Court limited its holding to "the specific context of school discipline."
420 U.S. at 322. The Strickland standard for determining whether qualified immunity is
available was applied to nonschool situations, however, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 43
U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975) (administrators of a state mental hospital), and Knell v.
Bensinger, No. 74-1803 (7th Cir., Sept. 26, 1975) (administrator of a state correctional
institution). Notably, both cases, like Strickland, involved a specific category of administrative
officials whose responsibilities and duties were directed toward a narrow class of individuals.
140 420 U.S. at 331 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141Id.at 329.
142 1d. at 331.
113
144 Id.at 329.
Id. at 321 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 125 supra.
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seer nor prophet. 145 The legal issues presented in Goss were obviously disputed and unsettled prior to the Court's decision. Now
that they have been decided, the Strickland holding, it must be
admitted, does demand that public school officials become familiar
with the essential requirements of Goss and administer their duties
accordingly. In sum, absent a genuine threat to the order or safety
of the school, 46 an official seeking to suspend a student must
afford him prior notice of the reason for the suspension and an
opportunity to present his version of the incident. 47 It is submitted, however, that this illustration of the implications of Strickland
demonstrates that the Court is imposing no more than a reasonable
standard of constitutional awareness upon public school officials
who have access to numerous texts specifically designed for the
purpose of explaining legal trends and developments to
educators.1

4

There have been allegations, most notably from civil libertarian groups,'1 49 that some school officials and even entire school
systems systematically act in conscious disregard of the constitutional rights of students. More.particularly, it has been suggested
that disciplinary penalties such as emergency suspensions are frequently used to enforce minor regulations or to exclude students
who are deemed undesirable.' 50 It has further been claimed that
internal controls upon school administrators are wholly ineffectual
and that some school officials habitually violate students' constitutional rights due to such administrative acquiescence as well as the

o

4SSee Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (officer not charged with responsibility
of predicting
possible changes in the law).
14
See text accompanying note 94 supra.
147
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
148See, e.g., H. BUTLER, K. MORAN & F. VANDERPOOL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF STUDENTS'
RECORDS (1972); LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SCHOOL BOARDS (A. Rozny ed. 1966); L. LIPPMAN & I.
GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION (1973); NOLTE, supra note 1; M. NOLTE, GUIDE TO SCHOOL

LAw (1969); M. NOLTE, SCHOOL LAw IN ACTION: 101 KEY DECISIONS WITH GUIDELINES FOR
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS (1971); L. PETERSON, R. RoSSMiLLR, & M. VOLZ, THE LAW AND
PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION (1968); E. REUTER, THE COURTS AND STUDENT CONDUCT (1975);
SCHOOLING AND THE RIGrTS OF CHILDREN (V. Hanbrich & M. Apple ed. 1975).
M See A. LEVINE, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS (1973), prepared for the New York Civil
Liberties Union.
150 Glasser & Levine, Bringing Student Rights to New York City's School System, 1 J.L. &
EDUC. 213 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Glasser & Levine]. In a report issued by the Children's
Defense Fund, the virtual abolition of suspensions as a disciplinary instrumentality was called
for. Contending that 97% of all suspensions each year are not instituted for violent or
dangerous offenses, the organization maintained that the principles enunciated by Goss and
Strickland are still being widely disregarded in the nation's schools. Finally, it was suggested
that increased counseling and special education could better benefit schools and students
than could the use of suspensions. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT INC., SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 79-106 (1975).
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lack of effective legal sanctions.15' Assuming such abuses are taking
place, the Strickland decision provides the mistreated student with a
152
significant remedy.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, in Goss v. Lopez' 5 3 and Wood v. Strickland, has expanded the rights of students and the responsibilities
of school officials. As a result of Goss, students are now entitled to
minimal due process proceedings before being suspended from
school. Strickland puts school officials on notice that they may be
personally liable if they disregard the established constitutional
rights of their students. These rulings do not necessarily represent
a new federal intrusion into the traditionally local domain of public
education. 155 Rather, they may be said to reaffirm the notion that
the rights guaranteed all Americans by our Constitution belong to
citizens of every age group.' 56 To deny students proper protection
under the Constitution would foster cynicism and a lack of respect
for the rule of law.' 57 As the Supreme Court has noted:
That schools are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to .

.

. teach youth to discount important

principles of our government as mere platitudes. 5 8

Robert S. Nash
151 Glasser & Levine, supra note 150, at 224-29.
152 Pursuant to the Strickland Court's decision to vacate and remand, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' right to procedural due process had
been violated by the expulsion procedure utilized by the defendants. Strickland v. Inlow, 519
F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit further ruled that the students were entitled to
prove their claim of damages against the school board members by demonstrating that the
defendants did not act in good faith as defined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 747. The court
found that the good faith qualified immunity had not been established as a matter of law and
therefore remanded that factual question to the district court for determination. Id.
153 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
154 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
155
But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'See notes 2 & 7 supra.
157 Glasser & Levine, supra note 150, at 229.
158 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).

